1 Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is expected to be a key feature supported by 5G networks, especially due to the proliferation of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), which has a prominent role in reducing network stress by shifting computational tasks from the Internet to the mobile edge. Apart from being part of MEC, D2D can extend cellular coverage allowing users to communicate directly when telecommunication infrastructure is highly congested or absent. This significant departure from the typical cellular paradigm imposes the need for decentralised network routing protocols. Moreover, enhanced capabilities of mobile devices and D2D networking will likely result in proliferation of new malware types and epidemics. Although the literature is rich in terms of D2D routing protocols that enhance quality-of-service and energy consumption, they provide only basic security support, e.g., in the form of encryption. Routing decisions can, however, contribute to collaborative detection of mobile malware by leveraging different kinds of anti-malware software installed on mobile devices. Benefiting from the cooperative nature of D2D communications, devices can rely on each other's contributions to detect malware. The impact of our work is geared towards having more malware-free D2D networks. To achieve this, we designed and implemented a novel routing protocol for D2D communications that optimises routing decisions for explicitly improving malware detection. The protocol identifies optimal network paths, in terms of malware mitigation and energy spent for malware detection, based on a game theoretic model. Diverse capabilities of network devices running different types of anti-malware software and their potential for inspecting messages relayed towards an intended destination device are leveraged using game theoretic tools. An optimality analysis of both Nash and Stackelberg security games is undertaken, including both zero and non-zero sum variants, and the Defender's equilibrium strategies. By undertaking network simulations, theoretical results obtained are illustrated through randomly generated network scenarios showing how our protocol outperforms conventional routing protocols, in terms of expected payoff, which consists of: security damage inflicted by malware and malware detection cost.
tionally, over the different routes, aiming at the highest expected damage. This type of Attacker was not simulated in [24] . 155 1.4. Main assumptions 156 Our analysis assumes that each device has some malware detection capabili-
System description and game model
This section presents our underlying system model along with its compo-233 nents. Mobile-edge computing (MEC) is an emerging paradigm that allows mobile 234 applications to offload computationally intensive workloads to a MEC server. This 235 introduces a new network architecture concept that provides cloud-computing ca- 236 pabilities at the edge of the mobile network. The MEC server is likely to be setup 237 by a service provider to ensure that it can provide a service environment with 238 very low latency and high-bandwidth. 239 3.1. System description 240 We use a motivational paradigm demonstrating how D2D communication can 241 be combined with a MEC architecture [41] , as depicted in Fig. 1 . In our model, 242 MEC is an intermediate layer between a D2D cluster and the cloud, aiming at 243 low-latency service delivery from the latter to the former, and it can serve users 244 by using local short-distance high-rate connections. The intermediate layer can 245 contain a number of deployed MEC servers aiming to handle the localised requests 246 issued by cluster users. 247 We assume that devices within a cluster can communicate in a D2D manner: 248 directly or by using multi-hop routes. The cluster is formed based on discovery 249 protocols that run in each device. These allow to sense the environment and 250 create a list of one-hop neighbours in order to be able to communicate should 251 any request to forward data or a direct request be sent. We also assume no cellular 252 infrastructure within the cluster, which means that devices can only communicate 253 in a device-to-device fashion. 254 It is envisaged that such scenarios will be very common in 5G ecosystems 255 where heterogeneous wireless technologies (e.g. NB-LTE, WiFi, ZigBee, Blue-256 tooth) will facilitate D2D communication [3] . For example, a device that seeks 257 some data, can request this from other devices in its cluster, and if the Request 258 cannot be served the MEC servers must be contacted to assist with the discovery 259 of this data. investigated in this paper and also this paper is not concerned about deciding 272 the nature of the cluster-head. 273 3.2. Adversarial model 274 As any open wireless environment, akin to one described in this paper, can 275 be a target of adversaries. More specifically, in this paper, we assume the exis- 276 tence of a malicious device, called the Attacker, that can launch a Man-In-the-277 Middle (MITM) attack by hijacking the link between the cluster-head and MEC 278 servers. Our analysis adopts the Dolev-Yao model [43] . According to this, the 279 D2D network, along with its established connection with the MEC servers, is 280 represented as a set of abstract entities that exchange messages. Yet, the adver-281 sary is capable of overhearing, intercepting, and synthesising any message and 282 she is only limited by the constraints of the deployed cryptographic methods. We 283 enrich this adversarial model by considering "compromised MEC servers". This is 284 to say that the adversary per se could be inside a legitimate MEC server interact- 285 ing with the cluster-head by using valid credentials and having privileged access 286 to MEC servers. In this way, the adversary can inject a fake Reply, crafted with 287 malware, and send it back to the data requestor aiming at infecting her device. In this adversarial environment, we envisage the use of anti-malware controls 290 running in each device. These can be responsible for scanning network traffic for 291 patterns to detect known malicious attempts. Each device may even respond to 292 newly detected attack methods (anomaly-based detection). Upon detection, de-293 vices can block messages that are likely to consist of insecure content preventing, 294 in this way, the spread of malware to other devices within their cluster. This as-295 sumption can be seen as an advanced application of the next-generation firewalls 296 to mobile devices. Although in this paper we assume that any detected malice is 297 blocked by the device that has successfully undertaken the inspection, our work 298 can be extended to support collaborative (e.g. reputation-based) filtering towards 299 blocking messages that end up having a bad reputation. Such an approach can 300 take advantage of learning techniques and its investigation will be part of our 301 future work. 302 
Formulation

303
Let us assume a cluster of N devices. We denote by C its cluster-head, and by 304 Rqs the requestor of some data. Henceforth we will refer to this data as D. If the 305 latter can not be found within the cluster itself, Rqs must seek D hosted by the 306 MEC servers of its cluster. Thus, C receives a Request from Rqs, and it then 307 queries the MEC server. When C receives back a Reply from the MEC server and Rqs is not within 309 its transmission range, a route r must be established to deliver D from C to 310 Rqs. Therefore, there is a need for the devices to relay D towards Rqs, but before 311 that, C must decide upon r. We assume R routes available between C and Rqs, 312 we denote by r j ∈ [R], the jth route, and the set of devices that constitute r j 313 are expressed by S j . Note that we use the notation [Ξ] to represent the set of Ξ 314 elements.
315
Although the route selection can be entirely taken based on quality-of-service 316 parameters optimising network delay and jitter, the presence of an Attacker, let 317 it be A, introduces uncertainty with regards to the malice of the data conveyed 318 toward Rqs. For instance, if A controls the link C ⇐⇒ MEC, then D can be 319 anything including malware. If this is the case, Rqs, which trusts C, is very likely 320 to be infected by this malware. In this paper, the infection risk depends on the 321 likelihood the malware to be collaboratively detected prior to the data being used 322 by Rqs. This detection relies on devices that forward packets to Rqs, as these are 323 also inspecting the incoming and outgoing network traffic.
324
Let us consider Λ different mobile operating systems, and M λ different mal-325 ware available to the Attacker to infect devices that run a mobile operating system 326 λ ∈ [Λ]. Each device may run one or more anti-malware controls and for each λ 327 we assume AM λ anti-malware controls, which can mitigate malware that targets 328 devices running λ. 
to express whether a control a z is installed in s i or not. 330 We express by d(m l , a z ) ∈ [0, 1) the effectiveness of anti-malware control a z in mitigating m l ∈ [M λ ]. As a device can run one or more anti-malware controls, and each control a z has 1 − d(m l , a z ) probability of failing to detect m l , the probability of s i failing to detect m l equals
(2) Note that each control detects different signs of malware and no interdependen-331 cies, in terms of detection capabilities, are assumed in this paper. To put it 332 differently, we have assumed that an anti-malware control is the minimal piece 333 of software that detects certain malicious signs. 334 We define as infected by the different malware. For more convenience, Table 1 summarizes the 345 notation used in this paper.
346 2 this is a function defined on a set X that indicates membership of an element in a subset X of X, having the value 1 for all elements of X and the value 0 for all elements of X not in X . where the Defender is the row player and the Attacker is the column player.
362
Each player's preferences are specified by her payoff function, and we define
Definition 5. The Nash Delivery Plan (NDP), denoted by ρ NE , is the probability 452 distribution over the different routes, as determined by the NE of the MDG.
453
For instance, a NDP (0.7, 0.3) dictates that 70% of the Replys will be sent 454 over r 1 , and 30% over r 2 . Note that this distribution does not determine which 455 Reply is sent over which route, as this decision is probabilistic. We say that the Defender maximinimizes if she chooses an RDP that is best 458 for her on the assumption that whatever she does, the Attacker will choose an 459 MP to cause the highest possible damage to her. 
(11)
Stackelberg mixed strategies 469
A two-player Stackelberg game involves one player (leader) to commit to a 470 strategy before the other player (follower) moves. In a Stackelberg model the 471 commitment of the leader is absolute, that is the leader cannot back-track on her 472 commitment. On the other hand, the follower sees the strategy that the leader 473 committed to, before she chooses a strategy.
474
In an Stackelberg MDG, the Attacker conducts surveillance before she attacks 475 and therefore she is aware of the Defender's RDP. For completeness, we consider 476 that this best-response is expressed also in mixed strategies.
477
In general, Stackelberg and Nash games do not have the same equilibria. For 478 instance, let us consider the normal-form MDG in 
2. for any ρ ∈ ∆ [R] , the Attacker breaks ties in favour of the Defender, that 504 is, when there are multiple best responses to ρ, the Attacker plays the best
that maximises the Defender's payoff: 
Optimality analysis 511
For the purpose of analysis, we consider complete information Nash MDGs, 512 according to which both players know the game matrix, which contains the util- 
The first term of (15) is the expected security loss of the Defender inflicted by the 
For a mixed profile (ρ, µ), the utility of the Defender equals
As Γ 0 is a zero sum game, the Attacker's utility is given by
Since the Defender's equilibrium strategies maximise her utility, 545
given that the Attacker maximises her own utility, we will refer to them as optimal 546 strategies.
547
As Γ 0 is a two-person zero sum game with finite number of actions for both 
Then, due to the zero sum nature of the game, the minimax theorem [46] holds,
The pair of saddle point strategies (ρ NE Γ 0 , µ NE Γ 0 ) are at the same time security formance.
570
We can convert Γ 0 into a Linear Programming (LP) problem and make use of 571 some of the powerful algorithms available for LP to derive the equilibrium. For a 572 given mixed strategy ρ of the Defender, we assume that the Attacker can cause 573 maximum damage to Rqs by injecting a message m into the cluster network.
574
Formally, the Defender seeks to solve the following LP:
In this problem, e is a vector of ones of size M . 1. every route r j ∈ supp(ρ NE ) selection is a best response to µ NE and, 2. every malware m l ∈ supp(µ NE ) selection is a best response to ρ NE .
580
Proof. First, notice that U d , as defined in (15), is a linear function in ρ(r j ) that 581 is, for any two RDPs ρ 1 and ρ 2 and any number θ
. Then, for the sake of contradiction, assume 583 there exists a route r j ∈ supp(ρ NE ) selection that is not a best response to 584 µ NE . Due to the linearity of U d in ρ NE (r j ), the Defender can increase her payoff 585 by transferring probability from ρ(r j ) to a route selection that is a best response 586 to µ NE , creating a new mixed strategy ρ * ρ NE . However, this contradicts the 587 assumption that ρ NE is the strategy of the Defender at the NE, as the Defender 588 prefers to deviate from ρ NE to gain a higher payoff, by playing ρ * . The second 589 part of the lemma can be proven in the same way.
590
Let us now assume a non-zero sum MDG, denoted by Γ, with the same 591 strategy spaces with Γ 0 , in which the Defender's utility is the same as in Γ 0 , 
For a mixed profile (ρ, µ) the utility of the Attacker is given by
Ξ S(r j , m l ) ρ(r j ) µ(m l ).
(20) (17) and (20) we have that
where 1 Ξ > 0, and k(ρ) is an expression that does not depend on µ. That is, the 601 best response of the Defender to any given malware plan, also yields the utility 602 for the Defender at the worst case scenario. 
Here is the observation:
Since Ξ > 0, the latter condition is satisfied if and only if:
In short, (ρ NE , µ NE ) is a NE of Γ, if and only if it satisfies: 
which is leads to a contradiction. Therefore condition (3) 
iRouting Response(n, L, T j , C j , S j , Rqs); 10:
break;
11:
end if 12:
end if 13: end procedure Algorithm 2 Responding to a cluster-head with a route to Rqs.
1: procedure iRouting Response(n, L, T j , C j , S j , s) 2:
s sends RREP Rqs to the (L − n)-th device of S j , let it be s i ; 3: if s i = C then 4:
iRouting Response(n, L, T j , C j , S j , s i ); 6: else 7:
Execute iRouting(Rqs, D, S j , T j , C j ); 8:
break;
9: end if 10: end procedure the set T j of vectors of "failing-to-detect" probabilities, for different malware, 716 of devices in r j ; and (iii) the set C j of computational malware inspection costs 717 c(s i ) of devices in r j . These values are updated while the RREP Rqs is traveling 718 back to C. When each device (e.g. s i ) that is involved in the route response 719 phase, receives the RREP Rqs , it updates T j and C j . Within the time period T req , C 720 aggregates RREP Rqs messages and updates its routing table with information that 721 can be used to derive the optimal routing strategy, as dictated by Theorem 2.
722
In the third phase of the protocol, described in Algorithm 3, C uses its routing 723 table to solve the MDG by computing the Nash Delivery Plan, denoted by ρ NE , 724 which has a lifetime T . Then, C probabilistically selects a route according to ρ NE 725 to deliver the requested data to Rqs. The chosen route is denoted by r * . Note 726 that for the same Rqs and before T expires, C uses the same ρ NE to derive r * , C derives the Nash Delivery Plan, ρ NE using S j , T j , C j ;
3:
C chooses r * probabilistically as dictated by ρ NE ;
4:
C delivers D to Rqs over r * ;
5:
Each device s i ∈ r * performs data inspection;
6:
if D found to carry malware then 7:
s i notifies C by sending a notification message along the reverse path;
9:
C blacklists the device that sent, through the cloud, D consisting of malware; beyond that is out of the scope of this paper.
738
While each data D is collaboratively inspected by the devices on its way to Rqs, 739 the derivation of the optimal routing strategy, i.e. the Nash Delivery Plan (NDP), 
Then, the probability of route r j to be chosen equals: According to Figures 5 -7 , iRouting achieves the best performance in terms of 827 average expected utility among all protocols. More specifically, iRouting improves 828 the average expected utility, in the case of a Nash Attacker, by, in average, 49%, 829 17%, and 7% compared to PR, AODV, and DSR, respectively. We notice that 830 the Defender's utility in iRouting is similar to the one achieved when DSR is 831 used. The reason for this is that DSR improves computational cost as opposed 832 to iRouting more than AODV and PR while exhibiting the best detection rate 833 among AODV and PR. Average improvement values are slightly more pronounced for a non-strategic Uniform Attacker; 16%, 68%, and 37%, as opposed to the 835 same protocols. The situation is similar for a Weighted Attacker, in which case 836 the corresponding improvement values are 18%, 53%, and 20%. We also notice 837 that the behaviour of all protocols but iRouting is stochastic despite of iRouting 838 having steadily the best performance. 
Conclusion
840
In this paper, we have formally investigated how to select an end-to-end path 841 to deliver data from a source to a destination in device-to-device networks under 842 a game theoretic framework. We assume the presence of an external adversary 843 who aims to infect "good" network devices with malware. First, a simple yet 844 illuminating two-player security game, between the network (the Defender) and 845 an adversary, is studied. To devise optimal routing strategies, optimality analysis 846 has been undertaken for different types of games to prove, in theory, that there 847 is a Nash equilibrium strategy that always makes the Defender better-off. The 848 analysis has shown that the expected security damage that can be inflicted by 849 the Attacker is bounded and limited when the proposed strategy is used by the 850 Defender. Network simulation results have also illustrated, in practice, that the 851 proposed strategy can effectively mitigate malware infection. In future work, we 852 intend to investigate machine learning algorithms (e.g. boosting) to convert weak 853 learners (e.g. devices with limited number of anti-malware controls) to strong 854 ones. 
